Donald Trump’s global tariff blitz, a theatrical display of economic nationalism from the Rose Garden, has been received in India with a peculiar blend of relief, irritation, and opportunity.
First came the sigh of relief—naturally tinged with a bit of schadenfreude. At 26%, the new tariff slapped on Indian exports is no love letter, but it’s not quite the slap in the face some in New Delhi feared, especially after their concessions to Tesla, Starlink, Alphabet, and Meta. After all, it’s not the 34% inflicted on China or the staggering 46% reserved for Vietnam.
Then came the strategic discomfort. The punitive rate feels like a betrayal for a nation hailed as a bulwark against China in America’s Indo-Pacific plans. Has Prime Minister Modi, once hailed as Trump’s ideological twin, overplayed his hand in trusting too deeply in friendship rather than strategy?

But perhaps most interesting is the third reaction—quiet but consequential. Among certain Indian industrialists and policymakers, there’s a whisper that this may be just the shock needed to settle India’s decades-long ambivalence about openness finally. The thinking? Trump’s tariffs are a political excuse to liberalise trade and diversify beyond China while, naturally, dangling market access in front of U.S. multinationals, sweetening the deal.

Of course, one must ask how Team Trump arrived at this 26% figure. Did someone in Washington confuse India’s GST with a protectionist wall? Is a cut to import duties on mobile phones really going to spare India the wrath of “America First” arithmetic?
Meanwhile, India’s export sectors are bracing for impact. Investment costs remain high, and local tycoons may need to decide whether they prefer subsidies for solar panels and smartphones or the old-fashioned discomfort of real competition. Giants like Tata, Adani, and Ambani may need to trade protection for innovation—or risk falling behind.

And while the BJP’s ideological mothership, the RSS, might still dream of a cottage industry paradise fuelled by nationalism and turmeric lattes, the country still doesn’t manufacture its own semiconductors—though it boasts more KFCs than ever. China, in a rather embarrassing contrast, does both.

For Modi, this may be a Nixon-in-China moment—an opportunity to cast off outdated ideas of self-sufficiency and embrace global integration in a way that feels… well, not too Western. After all, that’s how India’s 1990s economic miracle began: with a crisis. If Trump wants to play the part of external shock, why not let him?
Because sometimes, you need a tariff tantrum in Washington to spark serious reform in New Delhi.