Turkey’s Democratic Paradox: The West’s Favourite Hypocrite

When Turkey imprisoned President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s main political rival over the weekend, thousands of protesters poured onto the streets. However, the response from the country’s Western allies was distinctly muted. Erdogan, the commander-in-chief of NATO’s second-largest army, appears to be banking on the notion that the world needs him far more than worrying about Turkey’s democratic shortcomings. While the US and Europe remain engrossed in security concerns, Erdogan has successfully positioned himself as a critical power broker from Ukraine to the Middle East and Africa.

Aside from the predictable murmurs of concern from European capitals, the international outcry over the formal arrest of Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, was notably absent. Germany’s outgoing chancellor called the detention “depressing,” while Donald Trump’s State Department all but shrugged, dismissing it as a purely internal matter.
Erdogan has held power for over two decades, and Turkey’s government insists that prosecutors act independently of political pressure. Yet, critics who dare to challenge Erdogan have consistently found themselves behind bars, particularly this year, amid a fresh wave of arrests and investigations.

However, the imprisonment of a political figure as significant as Imamoglu, widely seen as capable of defeating Erdogan in the next election, is without precedent. Erdogan has likely calculated that Turkey’s growing strategic importance outweighs any democratic shortcomings. So far, this gamble has paid off politically, even if investors are now shedding Turkish assets at an alarming rate, undermining recent progress made to attract foreign capital.

Europe’s increasing dependence on Turkey, particularly given Erdogan’s expanding military footprint and defence capabilities, has only grown more apparent amid the war in Ukraine. As Trump reassesses US security commitments to Europe, Erdogan’s significance as a key player on the global stage has only grown. The international context works in Erdogan’s favour; he masters reading the room.
Indeed, Imamoglu’s arrest has triggered a predictable economic reaction. Borrowing costs in Turkey have surged, stocks have plummeted, and the Turkish lira has lost more than 3% of its value. Turkey’s central bank has intervened, with commercial lenders reportedly selling up to $9 billion on the first day of volatility to stem the currency’s decline and prevent further inflationary damage.

Despite the economic chaos, Erdogan’s grip on power remains remarkably strong. Imamoglu, a key figure in the Republican People’s Party (CHP), was taken into custody shortly after his university degree—a requirement for presidential candidacy—was revoked. Accused of corruption, charges he denies, Imamoglu’s downfall reads like a politically motivated takedown.
The 54-year-old has been a political force since 2019 when he defeated Erdogan’s chosen candidate in local elections. He repeated this success against another Erdogan ally last year, helping the main opposition group deliver an unprecedented defeat to Erdogan’s AK party.
Unlike other political figures from Turkey’s pro-Kurdish or nationalist parties who have been previously imprisoned, Imamoglu’s meteoric rise and popularity make him the most formidable rival Erdogan has ever attempted to sideline.

While Erdogan ruthlessly consolidates his power, the West grapples with its own conflicting interests. Trump is busy attempting to broker a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, with Erdogan generously offering to send a peacekeeping force. It’s worth noting that Turkey is one of the few countries Russia hasn’t objected to playing such a role—though President Vladimir Putin has been clear that he doesn’t want NATO troops anywhere near Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Turkey is trying to revive its role in the Syrian conflict, promising the Americans it can handle the fight against ISIS and ensure stability in Syria, freeing up the US to focus on other priorities.
During a phone call with President Trump on 16 March, Erdogan even asked for sanctions to be lifted on Turkish defence companies, sanctions imposed under Trump’s first presidency. Unsurprisingly, Erdogan also requested Turkey’s readmission to the F-35 programme, the high-profile joint initiative to produce America’s most advanced fifth-generation fighter jets.
Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, was positively glowing when describing Erdogan’s outreach. “I think the president had a fantastic conversation with Erdogan a few days ago—a real transformation,” Witkoff declared, dismissing concerns about the protests following Imamoglu’s detention. “We’re hearing much positive news from Turkey after that conversation.”

If Erdogan’s political ambitions remain unchallenged domestically, the same cannot be said of his economic track record. After being re-elected in mid-2023 and backtracking on his more unorthodox policies, Erdogan’s decision to bring back former ally Mehmet Simsek as finance minister was an attempt to reassure markets.
Turkey’s central bank subsequently raised interest rates to 50%—the highest level since Erdogan took power in 2003—and has kept them high long enough to rebuild foreign exchange reserves after years of depleting them. Inflation, which remains stubbornly high at around 40%, finally shows signs of slowing.
Yet, as Imamoglu’s imprisonment sends shockwaves through the financial markets, one inconvenient truth remains: investors are perhaps the only force left to curb Erdogan’s ambitions.
Turkey’s latest political drama highlights a harsh reality: while the West may voice occasional concern about Erdogan’s authoritarian streak, realpolitik wins the day. Turkey’s strategic importance trumps democratic principles every time.

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