The unrelenting flow of American technology into Russian military systems highlights a glaring contradiction in the West’s sanctioning narrative. Despite sweeping measures designed to cut Moscow off from advanced tech, evidence from the Ukrainian battlefield tells a different story. Russian weapons, brimming with components from companies like Intel Corp. and Texas Instruments Inc. (TI), underscore how sanctions are evaded and leave Western policymakers wringing their hands in frustration.

How does a microchip manufactured in Dallas end up in a missile targeting Ukrainian cities? A stunningly resilient supply chain stretches from Silicon Valley to Russian defence contractors via third-party distributors and opaque intermediaries. The simplicity of this process—and the apparent lack of robust controls—is both alarming and embarrassing for Western authorities.

Russian distributors have seamlessly integrated TI’s online store into their platforms, enabling customers in Moscow and St. Petersburg to browse semiconductor inventories and place orders as easily as shopping on Amazon. Transactions are routed through hubs like Hong Kong, bypassing direct restrictions, and ultimately find their way to sanctioned Russian military contractors.
For example, one Russian distributor processed over 4,000 orders for TI products worth approximately $6 million in 2024 alone. Roughly $4 million of these shipments were earmarked for military use. Despite TI’s assertions that it opposes such practices, the evidence points to a significant gap between corporate assurances and on-the-ground reality.

The US government has repeatedly urged semiconductor manufacturers to tighten controls. During a September Senate hearing, Senator Richard Blumenthal chastised chipmakers for their “objective and conscious failures” to prevent their technologies from bolstering Russia’s war machine. TI faced specific criticism for the laxity of its online sales process, which appears ripe for exploitation by illicit actors.

TI’s official line insists that it has ceased direct sales to Russia and prohibits its distributors from doing so. However, as the company admits, its supply chain is vast and opaque, making it nearly impossible to trace where its chips ultimately end up. While TI claims to screen orders rigorously, its delayed application of risk management protocols starkly contrasts with the practices of competitors like Intel and Analog Devices.
TI is also criticised for not requiring buyer end-user declarations—a common measure among its peers to ensure components aren’t funnelled into sanctioned nations. The lack of this essential safeguard has allowed intermediaries to stockpile chips, often routing them through shell companies in Hong Kong or Shenzhen, before re-exporting them to Russia.
A document submitted by a Russian defence contractor underscores the reliance on Western tech. It detailed a request for a voltage regulator manufactured by TI, citing no viable domestic alternative. Though seemingly trivial, such items are indispensable for powering modems in military communication systems.

The involvement of intermediaries like Hong Kong-based Sure Technology and Chipower Electronicsexacerbates the issue. These companies serve as conduits, buying chips in bulk from Western suppliers before rerouting them to Russia. Bloomberg found that the physical addresses of these firms often lead to anonymous offices in Kowloon, used by shell companies to mask operations.
TI maintains that it has blocked these firms from making direct purchases. Yet, evidence suggests that the supply chain is porous enough for goods to find alternative routes, possibly through stockpiles or secondary markets. This patchwork system underscores a critical failure in export control enforcement.

The scale of the issue is staggering. Despite sanctions, Russia imported over $1 billion in Western-made chips last year alone. While companies like Intel and AMD assert their compliance with export controls, their components repeatedly appear in weapons targeting Ukrainian civilians. The Kremlin’s dependence on foreign microelectronics remains an Achilles’ heel for Moscow and a moral liability for the West.
As Ukrainian investigators continue recovering Western components from bombed-out cities, the urgency for tighter controls grows. The US and EU have issued updated guidelines urging stricter due diligence, but the sheer complexity of global supply chains means enforcement remains challenging.
As long as sanctions can be circumvented with relative ease, the West faces a grim reality: its technologies, born of innovation and free-market ideals, are being repurposed to fuel a war that undermines those values.